Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2011

Emotion, Neuroscience, and Law: A Comment on Darwin and
Greene
John Mikhail
Georgetown University Law Center, jm455@law.georgetown.edu

Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 11-26

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/611
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761295

Emotion Review (forthcoming, 2011)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Torts Commons

Emotion, Neuroscience, and Law: A Comment on Darwin
and Greene
John Mikhail
Abstract: Darwin‘s (1871) observation that evolution has produced in us certain emotions
responding to right and wrong conduct that lack any obvious basis in individual utility is
a useful springboard from which to clarify the role of emotion in moral judgment. The
problem is whether a certain class of moral judgments is ―constituted‖ or ―driven by‖
emotion (Greene 2008, p. 108) or merely correlated with emotion while being generated
by unconscious computations (e.g., Huebner et al. 2008). With one exception, all of the
―personal‖ vignettes devised by Greene and colleagues (2001, 2004) and subsequently
used by other researchers (e.g., Koenigs et al. 2007) in their fMRI and behavioral studies
of emotional engagement in moral judgment involve violent crimes or torts. These
studies thus do much more than highlight the role of emotion in moral judgment; they
also support the classical rationalist thesis that moral rules are engraved in the mind.

In The Descent of Man, Darwin (1981/1871, p. 70) affirmed his belief in an innate
moral faculty, explaining that he fully agreed with Kant and other writers ―that of
all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or
conscience is by far the most important.‖ Darwin insisted that the moral sense is
not a mysterious gift of unknown origin, however, but the natural result of
evolution, with antecedents in the social instincts of other animals. He thus
famously argued that ―any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social
instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its
intellectual powers had become as well developed, or as nearly developed, as in
man‖ (id. at 71-72). And he laid the foundation of subsequent research on the
evolution of morality by examining a range of animal traits and behaviors,
including their sociability, desire for companionship, and the misery they feel
when they are abandoned; their love, sympathy, and compassion for one another;
and their mutual willingness to sacrifice themselves and to render services to one
another when hunting or defending against attack.
Darwin held that the social instincts of nonhuman animals developed ―for the
general good of the community,‖ which he defined as ―the means by which the
greatest possible number of individuals can be reared in full vigor and health, with
all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are exposed‖ (id. at
97-98). The same was true of homo sapiens, he inferred; therefore, neither
egoism nor a universalistic hedonism (the ―Greatest Happiness Principle‖) was
descriptively adequate: ―When a man risks his life to save that of a fellowcreature, it seems more appropriate to say that he acts for the general good or
welfare, rather than for the general happiness of mankind‖ (id. at 98). Darwin
endorsed Herbert Spencer‘s conclusion that ―‗the experiences of utility organized
and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761295

producing corresponding modifications, which, by continued transmission and
accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain
emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in
the individual experiences of utility‘‖ (id. at 101-102). Finally, Darwin held that
this combination of social instincts, intellectual powers, and effects of habit would
―naturally lead to the golden rule: ‗As ye would that men should do to you, do ye
to them likewise.‘‖ This rule, he averred, ―lies at the foundation of morality‖ (id.
at 106).
The idea that evolution has produced in us ―certain emotions responding to right
and wrong conduct‖ that lack any obvious basis in individual experiences of
utility is a useful springboard from which to clarify an important problem in the
cognitive science of moral judgment. The problem is how to understand the role
of emotion in moral judgment, and specifically whether a certain class of moral
judgments is ―constituted‖ or ―driven by‖ emotion (Greene 2008, p. 108; see also
Greene 2004, 2009; Koenigs et al. 2007) or merely correlated with emotion while
being generated by unconscious computations (e.g., Huebner et al. 2008). On at
least some interpretations, there are important differences between these
formulations, although these differences may disappear at certain neurocognitive
or neurobiological levels of scientific description. My claim is that the second
formulation—the Darwin-Spencer thesis, according to which emotions ―respond
to‖ independent moral appraisals—is a better working model of moral cognition
with respect to this class of judgments.
To see why, it is useful to look closely at the 25 ―personal‖ dilemmas devised by
Greene and colleagues in their original fMRI study (2001) and subsequently used
by a number of other researchers (e.g., Greene et al. 2004; Koenigs et al. 2007;
Moore et al. 2008). Greene found that these vignettes elicited increased activity
in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulated cortex (PCC),
superior temporal sulcus (STS), and amygdala. Because these regions are
associated with emotional processing, he concluded that these ―characteristically
deontological‖ judgments are driven by emotion. What seems to have escaped his
notice and that of the scientific community generally, however, is that all of the
actions described by these vignettes are well-known crimes or torts (Table 1).
Specifically, 22 of the 25 scenarios satisfy a prima facie case for purposeful
battery and/or intentional homicide (i.e., murder). Two other cases involve acts of
rape and sexual battery, while the final case describes a negligent (i.e.
unreasonable) failure to rescue.
With one exception, then, what Greene actually did in the ―personal‖ condition of
his experiment was to put subjects in the scanner and ask them to respond to a
series of violent crimes and torts. There are other relevant features of these
scenarios, of course; some of them raise principal-agent problems and others
involve duress or necessity, for example. Fundamentally, however, all of them
describe acts that standard legal analysis would classify as serious wrongs, subject
to conceivable, but ultimately weak, affirmative defenses. Moreover, all of them
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involve serious bodily injury and thus implicate the right to physical safety. By
contrast, only five of the 19 cases in Greene‘s ―impersonal‖ condition are
batteries, and only one of these batteries is purposeful. The other four cases
involve foreseeable but non-purposeful harms, at least two of which admit of an
uncontroversial necessity defense. The remaining 14 ―impersonal‖ scenarios are
a hodgepodge of cases that raise a variety of legal issues, including fraud, tax
evasion, insider trading, public corruption, theft, unjust enrichment, and necessity
as a defense to trespass to chattels. Finally, five of these residual cases describe
risk-risk tradeoffs in the context of vaccinations and environmental policy.
The upshot is that Greene‘s (2001, 2004) original experiments did not really test
two patterns of moral judgment—one ―deontological‖ and the other
―utilitarian‖—as much as different categories of potentially wrongful behavior.
The basic cleavage he identified in the brain was not Kant versus Mill, but
purposeful battery, rape, and murder, on the one hand, and a disorderly grab bag
of theft crimes, regulatory crimes, torts against non-personal interests, and riskrisk tradeoffs, on the other. Moreover, his finding that the MPFC, PCC, STS, and
amygdala are recruited for judgment tasks involving purposeful battery, rape, and
murder does not undermine the traditional rationalist thesis that moral precepts
are engraved in the mind (e.g., Grotius 1625; Kant 1788; Leibniz 1705). On the
contrary, Greene‘s evidence largely supports that thesis. Crimes and torts have
elements, and the relevant pattern of intuitions is best explained by assuming that
humans possess implicit knowledge of moral and legal rules. Naturally, violent
crimes and torts are more emotionally engaging than insider trading or
environmental risk analysis, but it does not follow that emotion ―constitutes‖ or
―drives‖ the judgment that the former acts are wrong. Rather, what drive these
intuitions are the unconscious computations that characterize these acts as battery,
rape, or murder in the first place. By mischaracterizing their own stimuli, then,
Greene and other neuroscientists (e.g., Koenigs et al. 2007) have drawn specious
conclusions and misconceived the nature of the problem.
Returning to Darwin, the main questions for cognitive science going forward
include (1) how the brain computes unconscious representations of purposeful
battery, rape, murder, negligence, and other forms of harmful trespass, and (2)
how these computations and the negative emotions they typically elicit are related
to the complex cognitive and socio-emotional capacities that humans share with
other animals (cf. Darwin 1981/1871; Spencer 1978/1897; see generally Mikhail
2007, 2009, in press). Future research should focus more squarely on these topics
and move beyond potentially misleading pseudo-problems such as how reason
and emotion ―duke it out‖ in the brain.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761295

References
Darwin, C. (1981/1871). The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Greene, J. (2008). The secret joke of Kant‘s soul; and Reply to Mikhail and
Timmons. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The
Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 35-79, 105-117.
Greene, J., Sommerville, R., Nystrom, L., Darley, J., & Cohen, J. (2001). An
fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral Judgment. Science,
293, 2105–2108.
Greene, J., Nystrom, L., Engell, A., Darley, J., & Cohen, J. (2004). The neural
basis of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44,
389-400.
Grotius, H. (1925/1625). On the Law of War and Peace. (F. W. Kelsey, Trans.).
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Huebner, B., Dwyer, S. & Hauser M. (2008). The role of emotion in moral
psychology. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13, 1-6.
Kant, I. (1993/1788). Critique of Practical Reason. (L.W. Beck, Trans.).
MacMillan: New York.
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M.,
& Damasio, A. (2007). Damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex
increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908–911.
Leibniz, G. (1981/1704). New Essays on Human Understanding. (P. Remnant &
J. Bennett, Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence, and the future.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 143-152.
Mikhail, J. (2009). Moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence: A formal model of
unconscious moral and legal knowledge. In B. H. Ross (Series Ed.) & D.
M. Bartels, C. W. Bauman, L. J. Skitka, & D. L. Medin (Eds.), Psychology
of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 50: Moral Judgment and Decision
Making. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Mikhail, J. (in press). Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy
and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Moore, A., Clark, B., & Kaine, M. (2008). Who shall not kill? Individual
differences in working memory capacity, executive control, and moral
judgment. Psychological Science, 19, 549-557.
Spencer, H. (1978/1897). The Principles of Ethics. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.

Dilemma
1. Transplant
2. Footbridge
3. Country Road
4. Architect
5. Lifeboat
6. Hard Times
7. Smother for dollars
8. Safari
9. Crying Baby
10. Plane Crash
11. Hired Rapist
12. Grandson
13. Infanticide
14. Preventing the Spread
15. Modified Lifeboat
16. Modified Preventing the Spread
17. Modified Safari
18. Modified Bomb
19. Submarine
20. Lawrence of Arabia
21. Sophie‘s Choice
22. Sacrifice
23. Vitamins
24. Vaccine Test
25. Euthanasia

Standard Legal Analysis
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Negligent Failure to Rescue
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Rape/Sexual Assault and Battery
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Rape/Sexual Assault and Battery
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Torture
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide
Homicide
Battery
Battery/Homicide
Battery/Homicide

Table 1: Standard Legal Analysis of Greene et al.‘s (2001) ―Personal‖ Dilemmas

